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Book review essay 
 
Evolution: A View from the 21st Century  
James Shapiro 




Nothing in biology makes sense, Dobzhansky famously claimed, except in the light of 
evolution.2 Without qualification the statement is surely an exaggeration, but 
evolutionary issues loom sufficiently large in biology to cast a shadow that extends 
well beyond the discipline. They have long absorbed the energies of philosophers of 
biology, for instance. If we see evolution as the quintessence of biologicality, the 
process that in some sense lies at farthest remove from the physical sciences, then it is 
scarcely surprising that it was a central player in the consolidation from roughly the 
1970s onwards of a biologically oriented branch of philosophy of science, with Hull3 
one of its foundational texts.4 To notions of biological fundamentality and remoteness 
from physics, however, can be added – perhaps a little awkwardly – another idea of 
comparable plausibility: that evolution was also the biological topic most consonant 
with the formalist outlook of positivist traditions in mainstream philosophy of science. 
For in biological evolution we apparently have a phenomenon in relation to which 
techniques of mathematical analysis and theory construction have found ready and 
often fruitful application. To appreciate the point one need only think of the work of 
Fisher, Wright and Haldane in population genetics, and the subsequent development 
of mathematical biology.5 
 
Why might evolutionary processes lend themselves to formal treatment? Relevant 
factors presumably include the relative simplicity of the neo-Darwinian conceptual 
framework and the fact (working assumption?) that biological populations can be 
partitioned in ways congenial to the operation of statistical methods under that 
framework. To recapitulate: small variations arise between the individuals within a 
species population as a result of random genetic mutation events, and cumulatively 
those variations give rise to functionally substantive phenotypic differences. Blindly 
but irresistibly natural selection, the heterogeneous set of pressures that favours some 
phenotypes and disfavours others within the context of a particular environment, acts 
to adjust the levels of representation of particular phenotypic characteristics within a 
population. As a consequence, the genes that give rise to those characteristics, so the 
story goes, flourish or are filtered out. Over long timescales, against a background of 
environmental dynamics and competition for resources, species tend to differentiate 
from one another. The tree of life – for we typically conceive of species relationships 
in arboreal terms – reflects the progressive divergence and distinctive elaboration of 
organismic lineages, as individual organisms succeed or fail in their battle with the 
environment according to the success they enjoy as mating machines. (That lineages 
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sometimes converge in particular functional or morphological respects must also be 
acknowledged.) In standard accounts along these lines – I am thinking especially of 
Richard Dawkins’ elegant popularisations – adaptation is a pretty passive affair. The 
process is essentially blind to the narrative details of individual history, admitting of 
no mechanism whereby an individual’s experience might modulate the resources its 
progeny inherit. 
 
In a distinctive new scientific distillation, leading bacterial geneticist James Shapiro 
contends that much of this familiar picture needs to be rethought in the light of 
advances in biological knowledge.6 His book will thus be of considerable interest to 
philosophers of biology, as well as to social scientists concerned to understand where 
the boundaries lie between the endogenous, the individual and the biological on the 
one hand and the exogenous, the social and the cultural on the other.7 His treatment, 
besides being notably concise, is an unusually personal one: it is difficult not to see 
imprinted in its form something of the author’s own academic background, which 
began with a BA in English Literature at Harvard. The PhD at Cambridge that 
followed, on bacterial genetics and under the supervision of Bill Hayes, developed 
into an interest in transposable genetic elements, which Shapiro was the first to 
discover in bacteria, and into a more general pre-occupation with mechanisms of what 
he terms ‘natural genetic engineering’.  
 
In order to be as useful to a broad readership as its author apparently intends, a book 
like this (especially when so titled) should accomplish three objectives. It should set 
out as clearly as possible the range and nature of the mechanisms in question; it 
should explain their broad biological significance; and it should highlight what in 
particular they mean for our understanding of evolutionary processes. Shapiro on the 
whole succeeds in meeting the first two of these objectives, although the third should I 
think be regarded as only partially fulfilled. Here the title is a little unhelpful, being 
likely to instil in the potential reader a variety of expectations which it is not the 
author’s priority to meet. As Shapiro suggests at the outset, his principal concern is 
with mechanisms that give rise to genomic variation that reflects an individual’s lived 
experience: 
 
Innovation, not selection, is the critical issue in evolutionary change. 
Without variation and novelty, selection has nothing to act upon. So 
this book is dedicated to considering the many ways that living 
organisms actively change themselves. (p.1) 
 
This means that for much of the book the emphasis is on the (physiologically) 
proximate rather than the (evolutionarily) ultimate, to utilise Mayr’s distinction.8  
Cognition at all levels 
The book is divided into four chapters (‘parts’). In the first Shapiro shows, using 
examples such as bacterial sugar sensing and the lac operon, how cell physiology 
depends on the coupling and integration of genetic mechanisms with other cell 
processes. These examples he sees in terms of an interwoven complex of cognitive 
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and informatic/computational parallels which at times are pushed quite hard, Shapiro 
arguing that “Life requires cognition at all levels” (p.7). Recognition sites on DNA are 
described as playing a genome formatting role which “can usefully be compared to 
data file formatting in computer systems because they are essential in both cases to 
accurate utilization of stored information” (p.10), while proteins are described as 
“conditional microprocessors in regulatory circuits” (p.11). Even the DNA replication 
proofreading process, we are told, amounts to a cognitive rather than a mechanical 
process, which at the same time Shapiro compares – and perhaps the comparison 
deserves to be explicated more fully – with fuzzy logic-based models of cybernetic 
control (p.14).  
 
We learn of the sophistication of cellular DNA damage repair mechanisms. Rather 
than passively withstanding as best they can the damaging effects of mutagens such as 
UV radiation, bacteria sense them and mount an active response. This so-called SOS 
response involves two distinct repair systems: a precise process that selectively 
excises UV-damaged DNA without introducing mutations, and a mutagenic repair 
process involving the induced synthesis of error-prone DNA polymerases. Without 
the latter, cells unable to replicate past any DNA damage will die, and so the price of 
survival (if I understand Shapiro correctly) is the introduction of sequence mutations. 
The importance of the DNA damage response in relation to Shapiro’s overall message 
is that even the evolutionarily fundamental phenomenon of mutation – traditionally 
seen as the foundation for the organismic differences on which selection acts – must 
be viewed as one over which cells exert a significant degree of control. This, with 
other examples, leads Shapiro to reject the Central Dogma as originally formulated by 
Crick9 as being simplistic and misleading. Information does not flow unidirectionally 
from the genome, but rather a context-dependent dialogue takes place between 
genome and extra-genomic processes.  
Genomic memory 
The aim in Part II, we are informed in the book’s preliminary pages, is to address “the 
many ways cells inscribe information into their genomes”. The “diverse inscriptions” 
at issue “constitute a form of writing that modifies the cell’s genomic memory” 
(p.xvii). Textual, linguistic and computational metaphors come together in the idea of 
operations involving string-like data structures (although Shapiro does not use that 
terminology), and the chapter begins with a compelling metaphor: 
 
... the view of traditional genetics and conventional evolutionary 
theory is that the genome is a read-only memory (ROM) system 
subject to change by stochastic damage and copying errors. ... [The 
new perspective based on cytogenetic and molecular evidence] treats 
the genome as a read-write (RW) memory system subject to non-
random change by dedicated cell functions. (p.28)  
 
Following a discussion of genome and chromatin formatting, which expands on what 
is said in Part I, come some technically dense sections dealing with a range of 
genomic processes and phenomena. The big picture is that particular kinds of genomic 
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change occur over different timescales, ranging from that of a single cell cycle, 
through the multiple cell cycles involved in the development of an individual 
organism, to the “countless” cell cycles over which evolution occurs. Within a cell 
cycle it is chiefly through the formation of transient complexes of proteins and nucleic 
acid that the genome reflects cellular circumstances, whilst over several cycles 
heritable – but also modifiable, e.g. during meiosis and gamete formation – epigenetic 
modifications come about through imprinting and chromatin formatting. In addition, 
in some cells, such as those of the mammalian immune system, genetic information is 
rewritten over the intermediate term by changes to DNA structure.  
 
The mechanisms of genome re-engineering to which we are introduced are numerous 
and diverse, and involve a plethora of molecular actors and genetic elements 
(including the transposons first discovered by Barbara McClintock and now known to 
be ubiquitous among prokaryotes and eukaryotes).  Some microbes, for instance, 
switch between different ‘phases’, according to environmental context, with different 
sets of proteins being synthesised in the different phases. Phase switching is achieved, 
rather surprisingly, by DNA recombination processes that invert either promoter 
regions or coding sequences. Other cases are known in which genomic diversity arises 
as the result of a range of recombination-based mechanisms. Perhaps most bizarre of 
all is the case of macronuclear development in ciliate protozoa such as Paramecium, 
in which within a single cell generation a whole new somatic genome, controlling 
mitotic cell proliferation, is built out of a germline genome constructed in a quite 
different way. Here is a species in which massive genome restructuring plays a central 
role in the life cycle. That underscores an important point: that these diverse processes 
of natural genetic engineering should be regarded not as accidental, the results of 
limitations in the ability of cells to control what their molecules get up to, but rather as 
targeted, functional, and perhaps even in some sense intentional operations. Genomes, 
then, are complex, plastic and responsive cellular sub-systems, capable of sensing and 
adapting to a variety of stimuli and shocks through regulated reorganisation. Not only 
do genomes generally not behave randomly, Shapiro persuades us, but entrenched 
gradualist assumptions about genomic change are at serious variance with biological 
reality.  
Against gradualism 
The perils of gradualism are well-illustrated by the case presented at the start of Part 
III. In 1967 the US Surgeon General announced that “the war against infectious 
diseases has been won”. The pronouncement stemmed in part from the finding that 
under laboratory conditions bacterial antibiotic resistance depends on the occurrence 
of multiple successive mutations, each individually rather improbable and in serial 
combination exceptionally unlikely. As single mutations generally produce only 
incremental resistance increases, it seemed safe to assume that there was no chance of 
full-blown resistance arising in a bacterial population. We now know all too well, 
however, that bacterial antibiotic resistance spreads rapidly in clinical settings, thanks 
to the transmission between bacterial cells of mobile genomic elements such as drug 
resistance plasmids. Again, Shapiro stresses the often sophisticated and functionally 
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specialised nature of the mechanisms involved in the horizontal transfer of DNA 
molecules. A greater appreciation of the extent of this inter-cellular DNA trafficking 
is now stimulating a reappraisal of the tree-based conception of lineage relationships, 
and the material that Shapiro presents is very much of a piece with that revisionary 
project.10 
 
Discussion of protein evolution lends further credence to saltationist points of view. 
Whereas at one time it was supposed that the amino acid was the basic unit of protein 
variation, particular functional significance is now known often to attach to the 
protein domain, or folded subunit. Particular protein domains are often associated 
with specific binding or catalytic properties, and when novel domain combinations are 
created through genetic engineering the individual domains typically retain their 
distinct chemical functionalities. Moreover, cells appear to possess the kinds of 
natural genetic engineering mechanism needed to manipulate protein domains 
combinatorially as a resource for adaptation and evolvability, leading Shapiro to 
speak of the “systems view” of proteins.  
 
There is a connection here, I suggest, with Monod’s idea of gratuité, which adverts to 
the contingently mediated nature of the molecular interactions involved in cell 
processes.11 The basis for the connection is that it is chiefly through the presence of 
domain recombination mechanisms and the like that the relevant contingency can 
meaningfully be said to exist. These notions of modular reconfigurability, of both 
genomes and proteins, encourage us to contemplate the cell simplistically in terms of 
somewhat stable building blocks, and this will likely be the interpretation of synthetic 
biologists as they attempt to reverse-engineer the functional logic taken to inhere in 
biological complexity. On the other hand, however, the modular decoupling of 
functional activities, and implied possibilities for radical reconfiguration of cellular 
and (hence) organismic functional architecture through relatively simple genomic 
rearrangements, may mean that cross-species comparisons will often prove 
illuminating as much for the differences they reveal as for the similarities. (Excepting, 
however, certain highly conserved, basic organisational features and operating 
principles.) In other words, making straightforward inferences from the presence of 
particular base sequences or molecular species to specific biological functions or 
phenotypic features may be harder than the simplified building blocks conception 
might at first glance seem to imply.  
From information talk to informatics talk 
Much of the molecular and cell biology that Shapiro describes comports nicely with 
recent work by anti-reductionist philosophers of biology, in particular in its rejection 
of the Central Dogma and of genocentric thinking more generally.12 (I have already 
noted the common interest in horizontal gene transfer and what that might mean for 
how we conceive of organismic lineage relationships.) However, Shapiro’s outlook 
differs from contemporary biophilosophical orthodoxy in certain respects, and to my 
mind this makes it all the more interesting. In particular, as we have seen, he 
frequently invokes an information-processing, cognitive/computational perspective on 
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cell processes. He is not alone in this: cell biologist Dennis Bray’s recent semi-
popularisation was subtitled A computer in every living cell.13 And even though the 
focus is largely extra-genomic, I suspect that when non-coding RNA regulatory 
networks are said to “form a highly parallel digital network that integrates complex 
suites of gene expression and controls the programmed responses required for the 
autopoeitic development of multicellular organisms”,14 Shapiro would endorse the 
overall figurative stance.  
  
What we should make of these informatic, computational and cognitive parallels is 
not entirely clear. Should they be seen ‘simply’ as figures of speech, aimed at making 
intelligible to a broad audience the functional relations that hold between different cell 
structures and processes, or ought we to regard them as making somewhat stronger 
ontological claims? And to what extent does it make sense to seek to relate them to 
the other forms of information talk we see in biology and elsewhere? The prospects 
there do not look especially good, informational perspectives on biological systems 
having often proved to be scientifically unrewarding.15 It is noteworthy too that 
philosophers of biology have so far struggled to agree on a philosophically 
satisfactory assimilation of information talk, and have in the main been silent about 
cognitive and computational cell biological perspectives.16 However, a spirited 
millennial campaign to banish information talk from biology, driven by the 
proponents of Developmental Systems Theory (DST) and waged on several fronts, 
appears for now to have been unsuccessful.17 A recent paper has reinvigorated the 
debate about the nature of biological information,18 relevant workshops continue to be 
held,19 and books published exploring an impressively catholic range of ideas.20  
 
A common thread running through both earlier and more recent investigations into the 
nature of biological information is a tendency to view Shannon’s mathematical theory 
of communication as the ultimate authority to which all debates about information 
must defer.21 How much does that theory really have to offer cell, and other, 
biologists, however? Evelyn Fox Keller has argued that the distinctive complexity of 
genomic and cellular processes may call for the development of new theoretical 
approaches to information.22 And if we find that it takes courage to be sceptical about 
the utility of Shannon’s theory, perhaps we would do well to reflect on the by no 
means implausible claim that the theory, “with the immense exception of the 
definition of the bit, is not actually very important in most areas of computer 
science”.23 Scientific and philosophical progress may be more likely to result not from 
focusing on the concept of information itself, whatever that is, but rather from 
investigating more closely possibilities for turning Shapiro’s informatic figurations 
and their ilk into something like an explicit theory of biocomputational systems. 
Ideally such a theory would be capable of relating the quasi-algorithmic nature of cell 
biological processes to computational systems as conventionally understood.24 This is 
a goal Gunther Stent hinted at over 30 years ago, in relation to the development of an 
algorithmic understanding of organismic development.25 More significantly, much of 
the intensive research currently being carried out in systems and synthetic biology is 
implicitly or explicitly predicated on the idea that cell processes are underpinned by a 
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logico-functional architecture of some kind. Indeed, some seek to adapt and exploit 
that architecture as a platform for performing novel biocomputations.26  
 
The thought that cells, and organisms, can be considered not merely to be like 
computational systems but as computational systems is an intriguing one. It also 
argues for shifting our attention from information talk to informatics talk of the sort 
for which Shapiro has evident sympathy. One of the charges sometimes levelled 
against information talk is that where it relates to genomic processes, it often betrays 
latent ontogenic preformationism, i.e. commitment to the belief that the genome 
encodes a representation of the developed organism. The charge is not a powerful one, 
however, for inasmuch as no one today really supposes that genomes describe the 
organisms that bear them in any straightforward (developmentally illiterate) way, it 
smacks of flogging a dead horse. But also, in that developmental processes are 
generally not blown hither and thither by every chance environmental factor, perhaps 
it is reasonable to think of genomes in their cellular contexts as hereditary “code-
scripts” 27 – provided we interpret that term informatically rather than informationally. 
Just as a computer’s hard disk drive is a storage device that has functional capacity 
only in the context of the host computer system, so genomes play a comparable 
functional role only in virtue of their causal integration with the rest of the cell. If 
there is code in the genome, its role is not to specify outcomes so much as it is to 
participate, with other cell components, in sets of self-regulating processes that 
instantiate the flexible biological capacities needed by living systems.  
Proximate means and ultimate ends 
The idea that genomes are protean in their ability to respond to circumstances to 
which they are tightly coupled via a wide variety of epigenetic cell processes, and 
hence have the capacity to influence the evolutionary trajectories of the lineages of 
organisms that bear them, is one which Shapiro imparts effectively enough. A 
weakness of the book, however, is that his enthusiasm for biological detail sometimes 
makes the going hard and the overall message more elusive than necessary. Bulleted 
lists and numerous tables provide useful summaries, but one sometimes wishes for a 
more discursive and measured assimilation of what by any standards is an 
exceptionally rich corpus of scientific data and findings. Unusually, this is a biology 
book entirely devoid of figures, and I fear that this will limit Shapiro’s 
comprehending readership to those already possessed of a reasonably strong 
background in basic genetics and cell biology. This is a pity. What there are, in 
abundance, are references to the relevant literature. Supplementary online resources 
are also provided on the publisher’s website, including additional references, 
suggested readings for ‘non-professionals’, and several appendices (which include – 
hurrah! – a number of figures). These extras could be seen as a useful bonus, or one 
could feel slightly cheated that they were not integrated into the printed book.  
 
While the various examples that Shapiro discusses all serve to reinforce the point that 
genomes are more plastic than we tend to think, the evolutionary significance of the 
various genome-reengineering mechanisms is sometimes not made sufficiently 
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obvious at the points where they are introduced and discussed. That said, Parts III and 
IV do, in the end, come round to reflect on big evolutionary issues and themes – 
although not to the degree that one might expect from the title. However, it is 
probably unreasonable of me to complain about that deficiency now, for towards the 
start of this review I set out (and tacitly accepted) what I took to be Shapiro’s more 
proximately oriented objectives. Perhaps, therefore, it should be deemed a measure of 
his success in meeting those that it is now possible to see more clearly the space that I 
think remains in the literature. This is for a synthesis even more ambitious than 
Shapiro’s, one that having taken fully on board the biology he sets out then goes on to 
explore in detail what it all means for neo-Darwinism and evolution-oriented 
mathematical biology. What, if anything, do the biological complications to which 
Shapiro introduces us mean for our understanding of the levels of selection debate28 or 
our ability to model evolutionary processes and phenomena? To what extent do they 
call into question the competence of population genetics?29 Are such questions naive? 
(If nothing else, the synthesis I am advocating should provide a sense of an answer to 
that question.) If they are not naive, then perhaps these are questions as much for 
philosophers as biologists, for the symbiosis between biology and philosophy can be a 
fruitful and transforming one. As it is, Shapiro deserves the thanks of many for 
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